Journal article
Söhnke M. Bartram, Gregory W. Brown, John E. Hund
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 86(3), 2007 Oct 30, pp. 835-869
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 86(3), 2007 Oct 30, pp. 835-869
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APA
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Bartram, S. M., Brown, G. W., & Hund, J. E. (2007). Estimating systemic risk in the international financial system. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(3), 835–869.
Chicago/Turabian
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Bartram, Söhnke M., Gregory W. Brown, and John E. Hund. “Estimating Systemic Risk in the International Financial System.” Journal of Financial Economics 86, no. 3 (October 30, 2007): 835–869.
MLA
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Bartram, Söhnke M., et al. “Estimating Systemic Risk in the International Financial System.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 86, no. 3, Oct. 2007, pp. 835–69.
BibTeX Click to copy
@article{soehnke2007a,
title = {Estimating systemic risk in the international financial system},
year = {2007},
month = oct,
day = {30},
issue = {3},
journal = {Journal of Financial Economics},
pages = {835-869},
volume = {86},
author = {Bartram, Söhnke M. and Brown, Gregory W. and Hund, John E.},
month_numeric = {10}
}
Abstract
This paper develops three distinct methods to quantify the risk of a systemic failure in the global banking system. We examine a sample of 334 banks (representing 80% of global bank equity) in 28 countries around five global financial crises. Our results suggest statistically significant, but economically small, increases in systemic risk. Although policy responses are endogenous, the low estimated probabilities suggest that the distress of central bankers, regulators and politicians about the events we study could be overstated and that current policy responses to financial crises could be adequate to handle major macroeconomic events.
This paper develops three distinct methods to quantify the risk of a systemic failure in the global banking system. We examine a sample of 334 banks (representing 80% of global bank equity) in 28 countries around five global financial crises. Our results suggest statistically significant, but economically small, increases in systemic risk. Although policy responses are endogenous, the low estimated probabilities suggest that the distress of central bankers, regulators and politicians about the events we study could be overstated and that current policy responses to financial crises could be adequate to handle major macroeconomic events.
